A Fiscal Federalism Analysis of Debt Policies by Sovereign Regional Governments
A Fiscal Federalism Analysis of Debt Policies by Sovereign Regional Governments
复制标题
主权地方政府债务政策的财政联邦制分析
DOI：
10.2307/136177
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Neil C. Bruce
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Neil C. Bruce
本文采用财政联邦主义的方法来分析次联邦（地区）政府的债务问题。家庭对某一地区有短期的依附关系，但从长远来看，可以自由地在地区之间迁移。地方政府自主选择财政政策。它表明，纳什均衡的区域财政政策是一个迁移是有效的，家庭保险对发生在他们居住的地区的冲击的特质部分。然而，地方政府发行的债务相对于在协调政策下发行的债务水平来说太多了，比如联邦政府可能会执行的政策。
This paper takes a fiscal federalism approach to analyzing debt issue by subfederal (regional) governments. Households have a short-run attachment to a particular region but are free to migrate between regions in the long run. Regional governments choose their fiscal policies independently. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium of regional fiscal policies is one where migration is efficient and households are insured against the idiosyncratic part of shocks occurring in the region in which they live. However, regional governments issue too much debt relative to the level that would be issued under a coordinated policy, such as that which might be carried out by a federal government.