Investment decisions and financial leverage under a potential entry threat
Investment decisions and financial leverage under a potential entry threat
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DOI：
10.20472/bmc.2018.008.008
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发表时间：
2018-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Shinsuke Kamoto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shinsuke Kamoto
本研究探讨在潜在竞争者进入威胁下，创业企业的投资与融资决策，以及债务的代理成本。这表明，毛尔和Sarkar（2005）所证明的过度投资问题仍然存在的潜在进入威胁。此外，它表明，当开拓企业增加杠杆，一个潜在的竞争对手加快其市场进入。此外，高杠杆率有可能诱使竞争者在经济衰退时进入市场，使开拓性公司面临被迫破产的风险。因此，潜在的进入威胁阻碍了创业企业的债务融资，从而缓解了股东和债券持有人之间在投资决策上的代理冲突。
This study examines investment and financing decisions of a pioneering firm and agency costs of debt in the presence of an entry threat by a potential competitor. It demonstrates that the over-investment problem demonstrated by Mauer and Sarkar (2005) remains in the presence of the potential entry threat. In addition, it demonstrates that when the pioneering firm increases leverage, a potential competitor expedites its market entry. Furthermore, high leverage creates the potential for inducing the competitor to enter the market in a downturn and exposing the pioneering firm to a risk of forced bankruptcy. Therefore, the potential entry threat hinders the pioneering firm from debt financing, and thus mitigates agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders over investment decisions.