Minimax control for cyber-physical systems under network packet scheduling attacks
Minimax control for cyber-physical systems under network packet scheduling attacks
复制标题
网络数据包调度攻击下信息物理系统的极小极大控制
DOI：
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复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
K. Johansson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yasser Shoukry;José Araújo;P. Tabuada;M. Srivastava;K. Johansson
物理系统的控制越来越多地通过网络来完成，以将信息从传感器传输到控制器，以及从控制器传输到执行器。不幸的是，这种对网络的依赖也给控制系统带来了新的安全漏洞。我们研究的程度，对手可以攻击的物理系统，通过篡改网络的时间特性，导致时变延迟，更重要的是通过改变数据包的传输顺序。我们表明，这种攻击可以不稳定的系统，如果控制器的设计是强大的对抗调度的消息。尽管人们总是可以将延迟的消息存储在缓冲器中，以便以它们被发送的顺序并以恒定的延迟将它们呈现给控制算法，但是这样的设计过于保守。相反，我们设计了一个控制器，使最好的可能利用接收到的数据包在极大极小意义上。所提出的设计具有相同的最坏情况下的性能作为控制器的基础上一个缓冲区，但有更好的性能时，没有攻击或攻击者不发挥最佳的攻击策略。
The control of physical systems is increasingly being done by resorting to networks to transmit information from sensors to controllers and from controllers to actuators. Unfortunately, this reliance on networks also brings new security vulnerabilities for control systems. We study the extent to which an adversary can attack a physical system by tampering with the temporal characteristics of the network, leading to time-varying delays and more importantly by changing the order in which packets are delivered. We show that such attack can destabilize a system if the controller was not designed to be robust with respect to an adversarial scheduling of messages. Although one can always store delayed messages in a buffer so as to present them to the control algorithm in the order they were sent and with a constant delay, such design is overly conservative. Instead, we design a controller that makes the best possible use of the received packets in a minimax sense. The proposed design has the same worst case performance as a controller based on a buffer but has better performance whenever there is no attack or the attacker does not play the optimal attack strategy.