Discussion of "QE 1 vs. 2 vs. 3...: A framework for analyzing large-scale asset purchases as a monetary policy tool"
Discussion of "QE 1 vs. 2 vs. 3...: A framework for analyzing large-scale asset purchases as a monetary policy tool"
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关于“QE 1 vs. 2 vs. 3...：分析大规模资产购买作为货币政策工具的框架”的讨论
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发表时间：
2013
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通讯作者：
V. Chari
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作者：
V. Chari
马克·格特勒和彼得·卡拉迪的论文是格特勒与一些合著者，特别是彼得·卡拉迪和Nobu Kiyotaki撰写的一系列论文中最新的一篇。所有这些论文都试图将金融摩擦纳入定量宏观经济模型。这些尝试值得大力赞扬。如果我们要在理解金融摩擦的作用方面取得重大进展，我们别无选择，只能遵循这些论文中提出的议程：对金融摩擦的性质采取立场，将其纳入定量一般均衡模型，用宏观经济和微观经济数据对抗模型并对其进行训练，并使用模型回答各种政策问题。这里讨论的Gertler和Karadi的论文是Gertler和Karadi（2011）的变体，扩展到允许中介机构持有政府债券。在我们手头的模型中，一个关键特征是非金融企业必须使用金融中介机构的资金来为持有的资本融资。也就是说，他们不仅使用中介机构的资金购买投资品，而且还购买生产中使用的所有资本。中介人反过来也受到抵押品的限制。在Gertler和Karadi的模型中，抵押品约束源于这样一种想法，即金融中介机构的管理者可以转移他们控制下的一部分资产。他们还认为，管理者可以转移一小部分政府资金，
Mark Gertler and Peter Karadi’s paper is the most recent paper in a string of papers that Gertler with a number of coauthors, notably Peter Karadi and Nobu Kiyotaki, has written. All of these papers are attempts to incorporate financial frictions into quantitative macroeconomic models. These attempts are to be applauded vigorously. If we are to make serious advances in understanding the role of financial frictions, we have no choice but to pursue an agenda like the one set out in these papers: take a stand on the nature of financial frictions, incorporate them into quantitative general equilibrium models, confront the models and discipline them with macroeconomic and microeconomic data, and use the models to answer a variety of policy questions. The paper by Gertler and Karadi under discussion here is a variant of Gertler and Karadi (2011) extended to allow intermediaries to hold government debt. In the model at hand, a key feature is that non-financial firms must use funds from financial intermediaries to finance holdings of capital. That is, they use funds from intermediaries not only to purchase investment goods but also to purchase all capital used in production. The intermediaries in turn are subject to collateral constraints. In Gertler and Karadi’s model, the collateral constraints arise from the idea that managers of financial intermediaries can divert some fraction of assets under their control. They also assume that managers can divert a smaller fraction of government