WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING
WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING
复制标题
监控不完善
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1990
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Stacchetti
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dilip Abreu;David Pearce;E. Stacchetti
研究了具有不完全监控的重复博弈的纯策略序列均衡问题。该方法强调均衡值集和嵌入在极端均衡中的静态优化问题。以“自我生成”为中心的一系列命题允许从静态问题的解中推导出约束有效超博弈均衡的性质。我们证明后者包括具有“bang-bang”性质的解；这大大简化了需要考虑的平衡。这些结果适用于广泛的非对称博弈，从而推广了我们之前关于最优卡特尔均衡的研究。bang-bang定理被强化为一个必然结果：在一定条件下，有效的顺序均衡具有这样的性质，即在每一个历史之后，均衡剩余部分对参与者的价值必须是均衡值集的一个极值点。自生成和bang-bang命题的一般含义包括证明了贴现因子的平衡平均值集的单调性，以及计算值集的迭代过程。
This paper investigates pure strategy sequential equilibria of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. The approach emphasizes the equilibrium value set and the static optimization problems embedded in extremal equilibria. A succession of propositions, central among which is "self-generation," allow properties of constrained efficient supergame equilibria to be deduced from the solutions of the static problems. We show that the latter include solutions having a "bang-bang" property; this affords a significant simplification of the equilibria that need be considered. These results apply to a broad class of asymmetric games, thereby generalizing our earlier work on optimal cartel equilibria. The bang-bang theorem is strengthened to a necessity result: under certain conditions, efficient sequential equilibria have the property that after every history, the value to players of the remainder of the equilibrium must be an extreme point of the equilibrium value set. General implications of the self-generation and bang-bang propositions include a proof of the monotonicity of the equilibrium average value set in the discount factor, and an iterative procedure for computing the value set.