On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model
On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model
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垄断模型中的价格识别和计算复杂性
DOI：
10.1086/261883
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发表时间：
1993
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
A. Rubinstein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Rubinstein
一个不可分割的商品的单一卖家所在的市场上，有许多消费者，他们处理信息的能力不同。消费者的约束被建模为两个子模型：第一个是关于价格空间划分中集合数量的限制，第二个是关于他可以用来处理价格报价的操作的复杂性的限制。对于第二个子模型的构造，借用了并行计算文献中的“感知器”工具。假设卖家提供商品的成本与消费者处理信息的能力呈负相关，我证明了消费者能力的异质性可以被卖家用来有利可图地区分他们。
A single seller of an indivisible good operates in a market with many consumers who differ in their ability to process information. The consumers' constraints are modeled in two submodels: the first in terms of the limits on the number of sets in the partition of the price space, and the second in terms of the limits on the complexity of the operation he can use to process a price offer. For the construction of the second submodel, the tool of a "perceptron" is borrowed from the parallel computation literature. Assuming a negative correlation between the seller's cost of supply of the good and the consumer's ability to process information, I demonstrate that the heterogeneity of consumer's abilities can be used by the seller to profitably discriminate among them.