Subsidy Targeting with Market Power
Subsidy Targeting with Market Power
复制标题
以市场力量为目标的补贴
DOI：
--
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Stephen P. Ryan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Polyakova;Stephen P. Ryan
实物公共转移通常是根据潜在接受者的可观察特征来确定目标的。私营企业越来越多地提供这种转移补贴的商品。我们表明，当补贴商品由具有市场支配力的中介机构提供时，补贴引发的“人口外部性”就会出现，并可能扭曲目标转移的发生率和效率，除非完全的价格歧视是可能的。我们在平价医疗法案（ACA）下对私人提供的医疗保险进行经济状况调查补贴的背景下，实证地研究了市场力量对目标转移的影响。在《平价医疗法案》的市场中，我们估计对消费者的补贴传递率不到50%，无谓损失达60亿美元。至关重要的是，我们发现市场力量不成比例地从较贫穷的消费者那里重新分配，导致转移所针对人口的消费者剩余和保险费率降低。我们的研究结果强调了在不完全竞争中介环境下对再分配政策的潜在担忧。
In-kind public transfers are commonly targeted based on observable characteristics of potential recipients. Increasingly, goods subsidized by such transfers are provided by private firms. We show that when the subsidized good is provided by intermediaries with market power a subsidy-induced “demographic externality” arises and can distort the incidence and efficiency of targeted transfers unless perfect price discrimination is possible. We examine the effects of market power on targeted transfers empirically in the context of means-tested subsidies for privately-provided health insurance under the Affordable Care Act (ACA). In ACA Marketplaces we estimate the pass-through rate of subsidies to consumers of less than 50 percent, with a $6 billion deadweight loss. Critically, we find that market power disproportionately redistributes away from poorer consumers, leading to lower consumer surplus and rates of insurance in the population targeted by transfers. Our results highlight potential concerns with re-distributional policies in environments with imperfectly competitive intermediaries.
平价医疗法案的早期影响（各州）
影响因子：
5.9
作者：
Kowalski, Amanda E.
通讯作者：
Kowalski, Amanda E.