Cooperation induction in two player bertand markets with linear demand
Cooperation induction in two player bertand markets with linear demand
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线性需求的两个参与者 bertand 市场中的合作诱导
DOI：
10.23919/acc.2017.7963663
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Warnick
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Hurst;S. Warnick
我们提出了生产者市场中具有二次收益的两人梯度博弈作为竞争环境中的行为模型，并表明纳什均衡是无效的。然后提出了一种使用旁路支付来诱导公司之间合作的算法，并显示了旁路支付策略的规则。新系统在合理均衡下的稳定性得到了证明，并且表明所有参与者至少与非合作均衡下的情况一样好。数值例子表明存在合理的平衡，并且该平衡的吸引盆似乎涵盖了所有合理的初始条件。
We present a two player gradient play differential game in a producer market with quadratic payoff as a model of behavior in a competitive environment and show that the Nash equilibrium is not efficient. An algorithm is then presented which uses side payments to induce cooperation between firms, and rules for side payment strategies are shown. The stability of the new system at a reasonable equilibrium is proved, and it is shown that all participants are at least as well off as they would be at the non-cooperative equilibrium. Numerical examples show the existence of a reasonable equilibrium and that the basin of attraction of that equilibrium appears to cover all reasonable initial conditions.