Beyond Institutional Capacity: Political Motivation and Parliamentary Behaviour in the Early Warning System
Beyond Institutional Capacity: Political Motivation and Parliamentary Behaviour in the Early Warning System
复制标题
超越机构能力：预警系统中的政治动机和议会行为
DOI：
10.1080/01402382.2014.990696
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Hefftler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gattermann; Hefftler
预警系统赋予各国议会干预欧盟政策制定的权利。本文调查了他们提交合理意见的动机。它通过ReLogit模型分析了2010年1月1日至2013年12月31日期间40个议会院对411项立法法案草案的反应。文章认为，除了制度能力之外，政治动机还可以解释跨议院和跨时期的差异。关于欧盟一体化的政党政治争论程度较高会产生积极影响，但政党在左右维度上的分散程度较大会对意见产生负面影响。此外，突出而紧迫的立法法案草案激励议会积极参与预警系统。最后，一些研究结果表明，少数派政府和经济衰退为一院制议会和下议院提交合理意见提供了积极条件。研究结果是根据各国议会在欧盟民主中的作用进行讨论的。
The Early Warning System gives national parliaments the right to intervene in European Union policy-making. This article investigates their incentives to submit reasoned opinions. It analyses the reactions of 40 parliamentary chambers to 411 draft legislative acts between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2013 by ReLogit models. The article argues that, beyond institutional capacity, political motivation explains cross-chamber and inter-temporal variation. Higher levels of party political contestation over EU integration have a positive effect, but greater party dispersion on the left–right dimension negatively affects submissions. Furthermore, salient and urgent draft legislative acts incentivise parliaments to become active in the Early Warning System. Finally, some findings suggest that minority governments and economic recession represent positive conditions for unicameral parliaments and lower chambers to submit reasoned opinions. The findings are discussed with reference to the role of national parliaments in EU democracy.