COMMERCIAL BANK DIRECTOR/OFFICER LIABILITY EXPOSURE AND THE AGENCY ISSUE
COMMERCIAL BANK DIRECTOR/OFFICER LIABILITY EXPOSURE AND THE AGENCY ISSUE
复制标题
商业银行董事/高级管理人员的责任风险和代理问题
DOI：
10.1108/eb028717
复制
发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Louise J. Clark
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bill Scroggins;W. Fielding;Louise J. Clark
本文介绍了对1000家美国商业银行的调查结果，涉及他们对负债风险敞口的看法和反应。此外，本文提出了一个应用的Modigliani米勒资本结构模型来说明的过程中，负债暴露主题的银行通过诉讼，这可能会导致股东财富的急剧减少的财务杠杆。
This paper presents the results of a survey of 1000 U.S. Commercial Banks concerning their perception of and reaction to liability exposure. Also, the paper presents an application of the Modigliani‐Miller Capital Structure Model to illustrate the process by which liability exposure subjects the bank to financial leverage through lawsuits which may result in a dramatic reduction in shareholder wealth.