Towards the elimination of nuclear weapons
Towards the elimination of nuclear weapons
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致力于消除核武器
DOI：
10.1080/13623699608409283
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Holdstock
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Holdstock
消除核武器的努力可能正在接近一个“没有-永远没有”的时刻。冷战已经结束，东西方核战争的风险比过去四十年的任何时候都要小。另一方面，如果核大国不遵守《不扩散条约》第六条规定的义务，即：本着诚意就早日停止核军备竞赛和核裁军的有效措施进行谈判。雅阁《第一阶段削减战略武器条约》和《第二阶段削减战略武器条约》，中国、法国和联合王国正在解除其运载系统的功能，但中国、法国和联合王国正在增加其核能力（例如，联合王国正在增加三叉戟）。印度、以色列和巴基斯坦都被强烈怀疑拥有实际或接近核能力，但它们都不是《不扩散条约》的缔约国。在编写本报告时，能否及时在日内瓦裁军谈判会议上就《全面禁试条约》达成协议，以便提交1996年联合国大会，尚待决定。目前，悬而未决的有争议的问题是：核查-核查的侵扰程度如何？和生效-在条约生效之前，必须有多少缔约方（特别是核国家和准核国家）批准？印度坚持要求核国家立即与核裁军进展的明确时间表挂钩，这可能会使全面禁止核试验条约谈判完全脱轨。美国计划从1996年8月开始进行一系列“流体动力学”试验，尽管严格按照零当量CTB的规定进行，而且最近又被“推迟”，但这是不正当的。这提醒人们，核国家可以接受禁止核试验的禁令，法国最近在南太平洋进行的一系列核试验部分是为了准备核爆炸的计算机模拟。专家们对新武器设计模拟的可靠性有不同看法，但一致认为，任何先进国家现在都可以在不进行试验的情况下开发出广岛式炸弹（正如南非现在所做的那样）。228-239）。
Attempts to eliminate nuclear weapons may be approaching a'nowor-never'time. The Cold War has ended, and there is less risk of an East-West nuclear exchange than at any time in the last forty years. On the other hand, the non-nuclear nations may not accept for ever the constraints imposed on them by the indefinite renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty if the nuclear powers are not seen to comply with their obligations under Article VI of the treaty to: pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.The United States and Russia are deactivating their delivery systems in accord with the START I and II treaties, but China, France and the United Kingdom are increasing their nuclear capability (for example, with Trident in the case of the UK). India, Israel and Pakistan, all strongly suspected of actual or near nuclear capability, are not parties to the NPT. At the time of writing agreement on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in time for presentation to the 1996 United Nations General Assembly is in the balance. At present, the outstanding contentious issues are: verification-how intrusive should this be? and entry into force-how many parties (and especially nuclear and near-nuclear states) must ratify before a treaty comes into force? India's insistence on immediate linkage to a clear timetable for progress in nuclear disarmament by the nuclear states may derail the CTB negotiations entirely. The US plan for a series of'hydrodynamic'tests from August 1996, though within the strict terms of a zero-yield CTB and recently'postponed', is perverse. It is a reminder that the nuclear states can live with a ban on testing, and the recent series of French tests in the South Pacific were in part to prepare for computer simulations of nuclear explosions. Experts differ as to the reliability of simulation for the design of new weapons, but agree that any advanced country could now develop an Hiroshima-style bomb without testing (as South Africa is now known to have done-see pp. 228-239).