Related Party Transactions and Earnings Management
Related Party Transactions and Earnings Management
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.612234
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发表时间：
2005-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Elizabeth A. Gordon;E. Henry
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Elizabeth A. Gordon;E. Henry
本文研究关联方交易是否与盈余管理有关。如果一家公司的高管和/或董事会成员参与关联方交易，以征用公司的资源，那么他们有动机管理收益，以证明（或增加）这些额外津贴或可能掩盖这种征用。另一种观点认为，关联方交易合理地满足了公司的其他经济需求，例如，通过提供深入的技能和专业知识或提供替代形式的补偿。如果是这样的话，就不会有动机去管理盈余，因为关联方交易不需要被掩盖或抵消;因此，我们不会期望盈余管理和关联方交易之间的关系。在本文中，我们首先提供了一个全面的实证描述的类型，在公司从事的关联方交易，然后调查是否关联方交易与盈余管理。我们提出了一个描述的数量，涉及的各方，类型和可用的，美元金额的关联方交易的331个公开上市公司在2000年和2001年财政年度。在我们的盈余管理测试中，我们提出的证据表明，调整后的绝对异常应计项目（我们的盈余管理措施），正相关的有限类型的交易，如固定利率融资从关联方。总的来说，似乎有理由担心关联方交易作为与盈余管理相关的因素，但仅限于某些关联方交易。仅仅存在关联方交易并不一定表明一家公司可能进行更大程度的盈余管理。
In this paper, we investigate whether related party transactions are associated with earnings management. If a firm's executives and/or board members engage in related party transactions to expropriate the firm's resources, then they have incentives to manage earnings either to justify (or increase) these perquisites or possibly to mask such expropriation. An alternative view is that related party transactions rationally fulfill other economic demands of a company, for example, by providing access to in-depth skills and expertise or providing an alternative form of compensation. If this were the case, there would be no incentives to manage earnings since the related party transaction need not be obscured or offset; consequently, we would not expect a relation between earnings management and related party transactions. In our paper, we first provide a comprehensive empirical description of the types of related party transactions in which companies engage and then investigate whether related party transactions are associated with earnings management. We present a description of the number of, the parties involved with, the types of and where available, the dollar amounts of related party transactions for 331 publicly-traded companies in fiscal years 2000 and 2001. In our earnings management tests, we present evidence that adjusted absolute abnormal accruals (our earnings management measure), are positively associated with limited types of transactions such as fixed-rate financing from related parties. Overall, it appears that concerns about related party transactions as a factor associated with earnings management are warranted, but for only certain related party transactions. The mere presence of related party transactions is not necessarily an indication that a firm is likely to engage in greater earnings management.