The Economics of Repeated Extortion
The Economics of Repeated Extortion
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反复勒索的经济学
DOI：
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发表时间：
1998
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Thum
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Choi;M. Thum
我们提供了一个重复勒索的简单模型。特别是，我们要问，一旦企业家进行了沉没投资，腐败的政府官员就会要求更多的机会主义是否会进一步扭曲资源分配。如果技术的选择是留给企业家，需求时间表的动态路径将诱导企业家追求一个“飞行的夜间”战略，采用一种技术与低效率的低沉没成本的组成部分。唯一均衡的特征是政府官员在未来需求中的混合策略。因此，我们的模型解释了为什么任意性是勒索的核心特征。我们还调查了腐败政权的稳定性的影响，动态勒索和讨论我们的框架的替代应用。
We provide a simple model of repeated extortion. In particular, we ask whether corrupt government officials' opportunism to demand more once entrepreneurs have made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations. If the choice of technology is left to the entrepreneurs, the dynamic path of demand schedules will induce entrepreneurs to pursue a ``fly-by-night'' strategy by adopting a technology with an inefficiently low sunk cost component. The unique equilibrium is characterized by a mixed strategy of the government official in future demand. Our model thus explains why arbitrariness is such a central feature of extortion. We also investigate implications of the stability of corrupt regimes for dynamic extortion and discuss alternative applications for our framework.