Environmental Governance in Federal Systems: The Effects of Capital Competition and Lobby Groups
Environmental Governance in Federal Systems: The Effects of Capital Competition and Lobby Groups
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联邦体系中的环境治理：资本竞争和游说团体的影响
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Gaston
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Per G. Fredriksson;N. Gaston
我们认为，集中和分散的环境治理产生等效的环境法规。我们是通过提供政治捐款来寻求影响力的模范工人、环境和资本所有者游说团体。在分散的情况下，工人游说对环境法规的影响与集中的情况下资本所有者游说的影响相同。这是因为在两种制度设计下，环境管制对收入的总体影响是相等的。当资本竞争发生时，工人在分散的情况下承担全部负担，而在集中的情况下，负担与资本所有者共同承担。我们提出的证据与我们的理论一致。版权所有2000年牛津大学出版社。
We argue that centralized and decentralized environmental governance yield equivalent environmental regulations. We model worker, environmental, and capital owner lobby groups that seek influence by offering political contributions. Worker lobbying in the decentralized case has an effect on environmental regulations identical to that of capital owner lobbying in the centralized case. This is because the aggregate effects of environmental regulations on income are equivalent under the two institutional designs. Whereas workers carry the full burden in the decentralized case when capital competition occurs, the burden is shared with the capital owners in the centralized case. We present evidence consistent with our theory. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.