Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. By Karl Mannheim. Edited by Paul Kecskemeti. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1952. Price 25s.)
Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. By Karl Mannheim. Edited by Paul Kecskemeti. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1952. Price 25s.)
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知识社会学论文集。
DOI：
10.1017/s003181910005960x
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发表时间：
1953
期刊：
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
B. Wootton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Wootton
反思使我们认识到，在人身上存在着“对上帝的含蓄的爱”; 2这种爱是作为必然性或“引力”网络中的某种“无限小”的东西而发生的（我认为这个术语是为了表示物质的必然性和精神的动机是物种的属）。这种“对上帝的含蓄的爱”在《等候上帝》中得到了充分的分析。西蒙娜·韦伊的神正论与莱布尼茨的神正论形成了极端的对比，因为它强调了恩典的看似无穷小的因素与世界的邪恶必然性之间的对比。世界之所以存在，是因为它是从上帝那里产生的;它显然缺乏完整的存在;它被创造出来是为了让我们的欲望摆脱感官的东西。通过沉思世界的残酷的必要性，特别是通过“让它进入我们的灵魂”的方式unconsolated痛苦，我们可能会成为de-created，因此重新进入上帝。这就是基督徒的道成肉身和钉十字架的形象的内在含义。当然，对比并不是那么简单。“极端关注”（一个中心概念）的批判态度在残酷的必然性和悲剧性的人类依恋中发现了意想不到的美。自愿的努力也有一定的局限性，这本身也是一种奇怪的必要性。道德是“我们对自己的暴力”。“它应限于明确和不可避免的职责。我们必须以平等的眼光看待道德上的善与恶，以便被吸引到善的方面。善良的心不是来自道德，而是来自恩典。我认为，她相当坦率地面对这类哲学的特殊困难。人们可以公平地称她为哲学的神秘主义;她的“极端关注”是可理解的相似性和差异，而不是感性的意象。她对天主教基督教智慧基金和教会主张的态度，以及她对清除基督教犹太教必要性的强调，在我看来值得思考。她的哲学概念是符合希腊的观点Theoria作为一个过程的转换到神（G。和G.，第118页及其后，删节）：
reflection leads us to acknowledge the occurrence of "implicit love of God" in men; this occurs as something "infinitesimal" within the network of necessity or "gravity" (I think this term is coined to denote the genus of which physical necessity and psychic motivation are species). This "implicit love of God" is fully analysed in Waiting upon God. Simone Weil's theodicy is in extreme contrast to that of Leibnitz, for it emphasizes the contrast between the seemingly infinitesimal factor of Grace and the evil necessity of the world. The world exists because it has issued from God; it manifestly falls short of full being; it is created to wean our desires from the things of sense. Through contemplation of the world's brute necessity and especially through "letting it enter our soul" by way of unconsoled affliction, we may become de-created and so re-enter God. This is the inner meaning of the Christian images of incarnation and crucifixion. Of course the contrast is not as simple as that. The contemplative attitude of "extreme attention" (a central concept) discovers unsuspected beauty in brute necessity and in tragic human attachments. And there is a certain limited place for voluntary effort, itself also a queer kind of necessity. Morality is a "violence that we do to ourselves." It should be restricted to clear and inescapable duties. We have to contemplate moral good and evil with an equal eye in order to be drawn towards the Good. Goodness of heart comes not from morality but from Grace. She faces quite candidly, I think, the special difficulties of this type of philosophy. And one may fairly call hers a philosophical mysticism; her "extreme attention" is to intelligible similarities and differences rather than to sensuous imagery. Her attitude to the Catholic Christian fund of wisdom on the one hand and to ecclesiastical claims on the other, and her emphasis on the need to purge Christianity of Judaism seem to me worth pondering. Her conception of philosophy is in line with the Greek view of Theoria as a process of conversion towards the divine (G. and G., p. 118 ff., abridged):