Endogenous sharing rules in collective-group rent-seeking
Endogenous sharing rules in collective-group rent-seeking
复制标题
集体寻租的内生共享规则
DOI：
10.1007/bf01047900
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Sanghack Lee
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sanghack Lee
本文探讨了集体寻租博弈中群体内共享规则内生决定的可能性。集体寻租被视为两阶段纳什-古诺博弈，其中共享规则先于个人决定自愿贡献而确定。该解是子博弈完美的，并且是通过逆向归纳法得到的。在同等规模的两个群体之间的竞争中，各群体的纳什均衡分享规则是根据相对努力程度来分配租金。这种情况下的总寻租支出等于 Tullock (1980) 获得的结果。当两个以上的群体竞争租金时，基于相对努力的分享规则很可能再次成为每个群体的纳什均衡策略。寻租支出总额也与 Tullock (1980) 的相同。简而言之，如果共享规则是内生决定的，那么租金就会大幅消散。
This paper examines the possibility of endogenous determination of intra-group sharing rules in a collective-group rent-seeking game. Collective-group rent-seeking is considered as a two-stage Nash-Cournot game in which sharing rules are determined prior to individual decision on voluntary contribution. The solution is subgame perfect and is obtained by backward induction. In competition between two groups of the same size, the Nash equilibrium sharing rule of each group is to distribute rent to each according to relative effort. Total rent-seeking outlays in this case are equal to those obtained by Tullock (1980). When more than two groups compete for a rent, the sharing rule based on relative effort is again likely to be the Nash equilibrium strategy of each group. The amount of total rent-seeking outlays is also equal to that in Tullock (1980). In a nutshell, the rent is substantially dissipated if sharing rules are endogenously determined.
K.Nagashima：自然。
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