Constitutional Dynamics in the European Union. Success, Failure and Stability of Institutional Treaty Revisions
Constitutional Dynamics in the European Union. Success, Failure and Stability of Institutional Treaty Revisions
复制标题
欧盟的宪政动态。
DOI：
10.1080/01900692.2017.1295267
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
Jan Biesenbender
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Thomas Doerfler;Katharina Holzinger;Jan Biesenbender
尽管宪法改革面临很高的制度障碍，但人们观察到令人惊讶的欧盟条约修订。这一条探讨了是什么决定了一项条约条款是否被成功地修改，以及为什么在随后的政府间会议上重新谈判这些条款。本文提出了一个解释成功和重新谈判的制度主义理论，并通过定性比较分析的方法，使用所有核心制度规定来检验该理论。因果分析表明，一个问题的低冲突潜力足以成功地改变条约。此外，一个问题的高冲突潜力及其根本变化足以使其重新谈判。
Despite high institutional hurdles for constitutional change, one observes surprisingly many EU treaty revisions. This article takes up the questions of what determines whether a treaty provision is successfully changed and why provisions are renegotiated at subsequent Intergovernmental Conferences. The article presents an institutionalist theory explaining success and renegotiation and tests the theory using all core institutional provisions by means of Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The causal analysis shows that low conflict potential of an issue is sufficient for successfully changing the treaties. Furthermore, high conflict potential of an issue and its fundamental change are sufficient for it to be renegotiated.