YOU CANT NOT BELIEVE EVERYTHING YOU READ
YOU CANT NOT BELIEVE EVERYTHING YOU READ
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DOI：
10.1037/0022-3514.65.2.221
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发表时间：
1993-08-01
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
MALONE, PS
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
GILBERT, DT;TAFARODI, RW;MALONE, PS
人们能在不相信的情况下理解断言吗？笛卡尔(1644/1984)认为人可以而且应该，而斯宾诺莎(1677/1982)则认为人应该但不应该。三个实验支持这一假设，即理解包括对所理解的信息的初始信念。被试暴露于关于刑事被告的虚假信息(实验1和实验2)或大学生的虚假信息(实验3)。一些SS在负荷(实验1和实验2)或时间压力(实验3)下接触到这些信息。学生对目标做出判断(量刑决定或喜欢的判决)。负荷和时间压力都使学生相信错误的信息，并利用这些错误信息对目标做出相应的决定。在Spinozan术语中，这两种操作都阻止了SS在理解过程中自动相信的错误信息。
Can people comprehend assertions without believing them? Descartes (1644/1984) suggested that people can and should, whereas Spinoza (1677/1982) suggested that people should but cannot. Three experiments support the hypothesis that comprehension includes an initial belief in the information comprehended. Ss were exposed to false information about a criminal defendant (Experiments 1 and 2) or a college student (Experiment 3). Some Ss were exposed to this information while under load (Experiments 1 and 2) or time pressure (Experiment 3). Ss made judgments about the target (sentencing decisions or liking judgments). Both load and time pressure caused Ss to believe the false information and to use it in making consequential decisions about the target. In Spinozan terms, both manipulations prevented Ss from ''unbelieving'' the false information they automatically believed during comprehension.