k out of n Oblivious Transfer Protocols from Bilinear Pairings

k out of n Oblivious Transfer Protocols from Bilinear Pairings
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DOI:
10.4304/jsw.5.1.65-72
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发表时间:
2010
期刊:
J. Softw.
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Jing Qin;Huawei Zhao
Jing Qin;Huawei Zhao
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Jing Qin;Huawei Zhao

文献摘要

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本文提出了来自双线性对的 n 个不经意传输协议中的两个非交互式三方 k。在这些协议中,发送者可以不经意地向接收者传输n条消息,而无需与他/她进行通信。发送者用来加密他/她的消息的公钥是由第三方创建的。接收者可以使用相应的密钥选择从 n 个消息中提取 k 个消息。接收者的选择是无条件安全的。如果在标准模型中接收者是半诚实的,则发送者的保密性得到保证,因为决策双线性 Diffie-Hellman 问题 (DBDH) 是困难的;而当接收者是随机预言模型中的恶意方时,由于双线性 Diffie-Hellman 问题假设 (BDHA) 成立,所以发送者的保密性得以实现。当发送者是作弊方时,接收者将检测到他/她并停止协议。提出了协议安全性的精确证明。
T wo non-interactive three parties k out of n oblivious transfer protocols from bilinear pairings are proposed i n this paper. In these protocols , a sender can obliviously transfer n messages to a receiver without communication with him/her. The public keys that a sender used to encrypt his/her messages are made by a third party. The receiver can extract k out of n messages at his/her choices by using the corresponding secret keys. The choices of the receiver are unconditionally secure. The sender's secrecy is guaranteed if the receiver is semi-honest in the standard model since the decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (DBDH) is hard and the sender's secrecy is achieved when the receiver is a malicious party in the random oracle model since the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem assumption (BDHA) holds. When a sender is a cheating party, the receiver will detect him/her and halt the protocol. A precise proof of the security of the protocols is presented.