The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements
The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements
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纵向协议的竞争效应
DOI：
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发表时间：
1985
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
H. Frech
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Comanor;H. Frech
多年来，横向协议和纵向协议之间几乎没有什么区别。两者都被认为是反竞争的，并且本身就受到反垄断法的谴责。然而，最近这种方法受到了攻击，曾经的传统观念已不再如此。事实上，越来越多的人接受这样一种观点：纵向协议很少会产生反竞争后果。那么，本身合法性将是适当的标准。在本文中，我们研究了特定纵向协议的竞争影响：制造商对其分销商施加独家交易要求。然而，为了保持分析的重点，我们不考虑最终的福利收益或损失。在早期将经济分析应用于这种做法时，Aaron Director 和 Edward Levi (1956) 认为，如果独家交易提高了竞争对手的进入成本，那么它就会是反竞争的。根据这一猜想（参见第 293 页），我们的目的是研究排他性交易阻碍进入的市场条件。 Howard Marvel (1982) 讨论了独家交易的实践。他提供了独家交易的效率理由，忽略了可能产生反竞争效果的前景，并得出结论：“因此，独家交易本身应该被视为合法”（第 25 页）。本文探讨了漫威可能忽视的反竞争效应。一、独家交易的市场条件
For many years, there were few distinctions drawn between horizontal and vertical agreements. Both were considered anticompetitive and subject to per se condemnation under the antitrust laws. Recently, however, this approach has come under attack, and what was once the conventional wisdom is no longer so. Indeed, there is growing acceptance of the view that vertical agreements can rarely have anticompetitive consequences. Per se legality would then be the appropriate standard. In this paper, we investigate the competitive implications of a particular vertical agreement: the imposition of exclusive dealing requirements by a manufacturer on his distributors. However, to maintain the focus of the analysis, we do not consider ultimate welfare gains or losses. In an early application of economic analysis to this practice, Aaron Director and Edward Levi (1956) suggest that exclusive dealing would be anticompetitive if it raised entry costs for rivals. Our object, following this conjecture (see their p. 293), is to examine the market conditions under which exclusive dealing impedes entry. Howard Marvel (1982) dealt with the practice of exclusive dealing. He provides an efficiency rationale for exclusive dealing, ignores the prospect that anticompetitive effects may follow, and concludes that "exclusive dealing ought therefore to be treated as legal, per se" (p. 25). This paper examines the possible anticompetitive effects neglected by Marvel. I. Market Conditions for Exclusive Dealing