On the instability of evolutionary stable strategies in small populations
On the instability of evolutionary stable strategies in small populations
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DOI：
10.1016/s0304-3800(98)00068-4
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发表时间：
1998-06-22
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Fogel, DB
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fogel, GB;Andrews, PC;Fogel, DB
进化稳定策略(ESSS)常用于解释个体和物种的行为。对ESSS的分析确定了哪些行为组合(如果有的话)不能被替代策略入侵。在自然条件下，产生ESS所需的两个假设(即无限人口和仅在平均情况下描述的收益)不成立。以往的实验表明，在更现实的有限种群和随机支付条件下，种群可能会以与ESS无关的轨迹进化，即使在非常简单的进化博弈中也是如此。这里的模拟扩展到具有不同水平的选择压力和混合水平的小种群。结果表明，即使在相对较低的选择压力水平和持续混合的情况下，ESSS也可能不能很好地解释小种群的行为。根据以前的文献，简要讨论了这些结果的含义，这些文献声称ESSS产生了对真实世界数据的适当解释。(C)1998 Elsevier Science B.V.保留所有权利。
Evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) are often used to explain the behaviors of individuals and species. The analysis of ESSs determines which, if any, combinations of behaviors cannot be invaded by alternative strategies. Two assumptions required to generate an ESS (i.e. an infinite population and payoffs described only on the average) do not hold under natural conditions. Previous experiments have indicated that under more realistic conditions of finite populations and stochastic payoffs, populations may evolve in trajectories that are unrelated to an ESS, even in very simple evolutionary games. The simulations are extended here to small populations with varying levels of selection pressure and mixing levels. The results suggest that ESSs may not provide a good explanation of the behavior of small populations even at relatively low levels of selection pressure and even under persistent mixing. The implications of these results are discussed briefly in light of previous literature which claimed that ESSs generated suitable explanations of real-world data. (C) 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.