Maximize Presupposition and Gricean reasoning
Maximize Presupposition and Gricean reasoning
复制标题
最大化预设和格莱斯推理
DOI：
10.1007/s11050-012-9085-2
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发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
P. Schlenker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Schlenker
最近的语义学研究越来越多地使用了一个原则，即最大限度地预设，这要求在某些情况下标记可能最强的预设。这一原则通常被认为不能归结为标准的格赖斯推理，因为竞争中的形式具有相同的断言内容。然而，我们认为，最大限度的预设可能可以归结为标量蕴涵理论。(I)首先，我们考虑一种特殊情况：说话人说出的句子带有预设p，而收信人最初并不认为这是理所当然的，但后者认为说话人是该事项的权威。发出预设信号为收件人提供了新的信息；但它也源于预设的逻辑，即预设因此被满足(Stalnaker，Ling Philos 25(5-6)：701-721,2002)。(Ii)第二，我们将这一解决方案推广到其他情况。我们假设，即使当p是普遍的信念时，收信人可能忘记它的可能性也很小(错误)；在这种情况下，标记一个预设将通过重新建立部分原始上下文来产生新的信息。我们还采纳了Raj Singh(Nat Lang Semantics 19(2)：149-168,2011)的假设，即预设最大化是相对于局部语境计算的--我们假设这些假设也容易出错；这解释了证明预设合理的信息是通过语言提供的。(Iii)最后，我们认为我们的假设在隐含领域有好处：它们使我们有可能将马格里的“盲目”(即上下文无关)隐含重新解释为上下文敏感的隐含，只是碰巧具有误导性。
Recent semantic research has made increasing use of a principle, Maximize Presupposition, which requires that under certain circumstances the strongest possible presupposition be marked. This principle is generally taken to be irreducible to standard Gricean reasoning because the forms that are in competition have the same assertive content. We suggest, however, that Maximize Presupposition might be reducible to the theory of scalar implicatures. (i)First, we consider a special case: the speaker utters a sentence with a presupposition p which is not initially taken for granted by the addressee, but the latter takes the speaker to be an authority on the matter. Signaling the presupposition provides new information to the addressee; but it also follows from the logic of presupposition qua common belief that the presupposition is thereby satisfied (Stalnaker, Ling Philos 25(5–6):701–721, 2002). (ii) Second, we generalize this solution to other cases. We assume that even when p is common belief, there is a very small chance that the addressee might forget it (‘Fallibility’); in such cases, marking a presupposition will turn out to generate new information by re-establishing part of the original context. We also adopt from Raj Singh (Nat Lang Semantics 19(2):149–168, 2011) the hypothesis that presupposition maximization is computed relative to local contexts—and we assume that these too are subject to Fallibility; this accounts for cases in which the information that justifies the presupposition is linguistically provided. (iii) Finally, we suggest that our assumptions have benefits in the domain of implicatures: they make it possible to reinterpret Magri’s ‘blind’ (i.e. context-insensitive) implicatures as context-sensitive implicatures which just happen to be misleading.