A supply chain member should set its margin later if another member's cost is highly uncertain
A supply chain member should set its margin later if another member's cost is highly uncertain
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2018.11.027
复制
发表时间：
2019-05
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. Matsui
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Matsui
近年来，在供应商确定消费品的利润率或批发价格之前，大型零售商就向供应商索要利润率的情况时有发生，这反映了供应链中从上游供应商向下游零售商的权力转移。在供应链权力结构发生变化的背景下，基于随机博弈论的供应链模型，研究了在不确定性条件下供应链成员何时设定利润率的实际决策问题.我们假设一个典型的两级供应链，其中包括一个制造商和一个零售商，每个决定的基础上，其边际成本的私人信息的产品的利润。因此，企业的成本结构是不确定的，只有企业自己知道。我们构建了一个不完全信息博弈模型，得出以下明确的管理含义：供应链成员应设置其利润率后，如果其他成员的成本是高度不确定的。通过延迟决策，后动成员可以通过观察先动成员所要求的利润率，对先动成员的成本做出更精确的推断，从而选择更理想的利润率。尽管目前在各种消费品类别中，权力从制造商转移到大型零售商，但我们的结果警告零售商，如果它仅仅因为拥有权力而在不确定的环境中要求制造商提供利润，它可能会割断自己的喉咙。
Recently, there have been several cases in which a large-scale retailer has demanded a margin for a consumer product from a supplier before the supplier has determined the margin or the wholesale price, reflecting a power shift from upstream suppliers to downstream retailers in supply chains. Given the recent change of power structures in supply chains, we investigate a practical decision-making problem of when a supply chain member should set its margin in the presence of uncertainty based on a stochastic game-theoretic supply chain model. We assume a typical two-echelon supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer, each of which determines the margin of a product based on private information of its marginal cost. Hence, the cost structure of a firm is uncertain and is known only to the firm. We construct an incomplete information game model with this setting, drawing the following clear-cut managerial implication: a supply chain member should set its margin later if the other member's cost is highly uncertain. By delaying decision-making, the late-moving member can make a more precise inference on the cost of the early-moving member by observing the margin demanded by the early-mover, thereby choosing a more desirable margin. Despite the current power shift from manufacturers to large-scale retailers in various consumer product categories, our result warns a retailer that if it assumes leadership to demand a margin from a manufacturer in an uncertain environment simply because it has power, it may cut its own throat.