Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents
Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1682192
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发表时间：
2010-09
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Acemoglu;Dan Cao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Acemoglu;Dan Cao
我们扩展了熊彼特的内生增长模型，允许现有企业进行创新以改进其产品，而进入者则进行更“激进”的创新以取代现有企业。我们的模型提供了一个易于处理的框架，新企业的进入和持续企业的生产率提高驱动的增长进行分析。与基本的熊彼特模型不同，对潜在进入者的补贴可能会降低经济增长，因为它们阻碍了现有企业为应对进入减少而提高生产率，这可能会超过更大的创造性破坏的积极影响。由于该模型的特点是新企业的进入和现有企业的扩张和退出，它也产生了一个非退化的均衡企业规模分布。我们表明，当也有昂贵的模仿防止任何部门下降太远低于平均水平，固定的企业规模分布是帕累托指数约等于1（所谓的“齐普夫分布”）。
We extend the basic Schumpeterian endogenous growth model by allowing incumbents to undertake innovations to improve their products, while entrants engage in more "radical" innovations to replace incumbents. Our model provides a tractable framework for the analysis of growth driven by both entry of new firms and productivity improvements by continuing firms. Unlike in the basic Schumpeterian models, subsidies to potential entrants might decrease economic growth because they discourage productivity improvements by incumbents in response to reduced entry, which may outweigh the positive effect of greater creative destruction. As the model features entry of new firms and expansion and exit of existing firms, it also generates a non-degenerate equilibrium firm size distribution. We show that, when there is also costly imitation preventing any sector from falling too far below the average, the stationary firm size distribution is Pareto with an exponent approximately equal to one (the so-called "Zipf distribution").