The philosophical basis of algorithmic recourse
The philosophical basis of algorithmic recourse
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DOI：
10.1145/3351095.3372876
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发表时间：
2020-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Venkatasubramanian;M. Alfano
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Venkatasubramanian;M. Alfano
哲学家已经确定，某些在道德上重要的价值观在系统上在各种反事实场景中提供相关益处的意义上是强大的。在本文中，我们争辩说，追索权 - 逆转算法和官僚机构在各种反事实场景中进行不利决策的系统过程 - 是一种非常强大的好处。特别是，我们认为，良好生活的两个基本要素 - 时间扩展的代理和信任 - 是通过追索权承担的。我们批评了现有的方法，以解决方案的概念化，操作和实施。根据这些批评，我们建议一种修订的追索方法，并举例说明如何实施它 - 尤其是对于那些不好的人1。
Philosophers have established that certain ethically important values are modally robust in the sense that they systematically deliver correlative benefits across a range of counterfactual scenarios. In this paper, we contend that recourse - the systematic process of reversing unfavorable decisions by algorithms and bureaucracies across a range of counterfactual scenarios - is such a modally robust good. In particular, we argue that two essential components of a good life - temporally extended agency and trust - are underwritten by recourse. We critique existing approaches to the conceptualization, operationalization and implementation of recourse. Based on these criticisms, we suggest a revised approach to recourse and give examples of how it might be implemented - especially for those who are least well off1.