Gerrymanders and Theories of Law Making: A Study of Legislative Redistricting in Illinois
Gerrymanders and Theories of Law Making: A Study of Legislative Redistricting in Illinois
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选区划分不公与立法理论：伊利诺伊州立法选区重划研究
DOI：
10.1017/s0022381607080115
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Alan E. Wiseman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Michael C. Herron;Alan E. Wiseman
伊利诺伊州的选区划分为检验立法的竞争理论提供了一个新的机会。考虑到这一点，我们表明，2000年后的人口普查选区在伊利诺伊州，民主党人为主，战略性地重新洗牌区人口概况，试图转换相对自由的共和党地区保守的民主党地区在州参议院，同时减少和增加的意识形态多样性的民主党人和共和党人，分别在众议院。这样的改组表明，伊利诺伊州的立法政治是以一种与联盟形成的选票购买理论相一致的方式进行的。
Redistricting politics in Illinois provide a novel opportunity for testing competing theories of law making. With this in mind, we demonstrate that the post-2000 Census redistricters in Illinois, dominated by Democrats, strategically reshuffled district demographic profiles in an attempt to convert relatively liberal Republican districts to conservative Democratic districts in the state Senate while decreasing and increasing the ideological diversity of the Democrats and Republicans, respectively, in the House. Such reshufflings suggest that legislative politics in Illinois are conducted in a manner consistent with vote-buying theories of coalition formation.