Does the Frequency of Pay-for-Performance Payment Matter?-Experience from a Randomized Trial
Does the Frequency of Pay-for-Performance Payment Matter?-Experience from a Randomized Trial
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1475-6773.2009.01072.x
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发表时间：
2010-04-01
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
Luft, Harold
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Chung, Sukyung;Palaniappan, Latha;Luft, Harold
目的在一项医生绩效薪酬（P4P）实验中，检验激励支付频率对质量指标的影响。研究设置一个多专业的医生群体实践。研究设计2007年，所有的初级保健医生（n=179）被随机分为两个研究组，研究组的激励支付频率不同，要么是四个季度的奖金支票，要么是一个年终奖金（最多美元）。数据收集/提取方法数据从电子健康记录中提取。两个武器之间的质量测量分数超过四个quartes.Principal FindingsThere是两个武器之间的平均质量测量分数或在总奖金earned.ConclusionsPhysicians的反应P4P程序与一个小的最大奖金没有不同的奖金支付的频率。
ObjectiveTo examine the effects of incentive payment frequency on quality measures in a physician-specific pay-for-performance (P4P) experiment.Study SettingA multispecialty physician group practice.Study DesignIn 2007, all primary care physicians (n=179) were randomized into two study arms differing by the frequency of incentive payment, either four quarterly bonus checks or a single year-end bonus (maximum of U.S.$5,000/year for both arms).Data Collection/Extraction MethodsData were extracted from electronic health records. Quality measure scores between the two arms over four quarters were compared.Principal FindingsThere was no difference between the two arms in average quality measure score or in total bonus amount earned.ConclusionsPhysicians' responses to a P4P program with a small maximum bonus do not differ by frequency of bonus payment.