Epistemic Permissiveness
Epistemic Permissiveness
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DOI：
10.1002/9781119420828.ch18
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Roger White
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文献类型：
--
作者：
Roger White
一个理性的人不会相信任何事情。理性相信的事物是有限度的。这些限制有多宽？这是我感兴趣的主要问题。但第二个问题立即出现：哪些因素施加了这些限制？第一个观点是，一个人的证据决定了一个人在认识上可以相信什么。许多人会声称还有更多与信仰的认知合理性相关的非证据因素。我将忽略替代答案的细节，以便专注于一个人的证据对信念施加什么样的理性约束的问题。我们的主要问题是认知许可和义务可以分开到什么程度。 1 假设我在认识上被允许相信 P，也就是说，我相信它并不是非理性的。因此我是否有义务相信 P，或者我是否有其他合理的选择？ 2 我是否可以同样理性地对 P 保持不可知论，甚至相信非 P？或者，稍微强一点或弱一点的信心也同样合理吗？ 1. 宽容认识论的例子和动机继费尔德曼（即将发表）之后，我们可以将否定答案称为独特性命题。独特性：鉴于一个人的全部证据，人们可以对任何命题采取一种独特的理性信念态度。 3 我将偏离独特性的立场称为“宽容的”，因为它们意味着认知理性允许一系列替代性的信仰态度。许多哲学家持有宽容的认识论。拒绝独特性是表面上表明你有理由维持你的信念，直到你有理由放弃它们。
A rational person doesn't believe just anything. There are limits on what it is rational to believe. How wide are these limits? That's the main question that interests me here. But a secondary question immediately arises: What factors impose these limits? A first stab is to say that one's evidence determines what it is epistemically permissible for one to believe. Many will claim that there are further, non-evidentiary factors relevant to the epistemic rationality of belief. I will be ignoring the details of alternative answers in order to focus on the question of what kind of rational constraints one's evidence puts on belief. Our main question concerns how far epistemic permission and obligation can come apart. 1 Suppose I am epistemically permitted to believe P, i.e., it would not be irrational for me to believe it. Am I thereby obliged to believe P, or are other options rationally available to me? 2 Might I be equally rational in remaining agnostic about P, or even believing not-P? Or could even a slightly stronger or weaker degree of confidence be just as reasonable? 1. Examples and Motivations for Permissive Epistemology Following Feldman (forthcoming) we can call the negative answer the Uniqueness thesis. Uniqueness: Given one's total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition. 3 I call positions that depart from Uniqueness ''permissive'' as they entail that epistemic rationality permits a range of alternative doxastic attitudes. Many philosophers hold permissive epistemologies. Rejection of Uniqueness is promi-suggest that you are prima facie justified in maintaining your beliefs until you have a reason to abandon them.