Careerist judges and the appeals process
Careerist judges and the appeals process
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职业法官和上诉程序
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发表时间：
2005
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Gilat Levy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Gilat Levy
我分析了野心家的法官是如何利用他们在审议过程中发现的信息以及之前决定的相关信息来制定他们的决定的。我假设法官有声誉方面的考虑，并试图向评估人员发出信号，表明他们可以正确地解释法律。如果提出上诉，上诉法院的裁决表明法官是否正确地解释了法律，并允许评估者评估法官的能力。因此，评价员的监测可能性是内生的，因为上诉的可能性取决于法官的决定。我发现有职业考虑的法官往往是“创造性的”，也就是说，低效地反驳先前的决定。
I analyze how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during deliberations as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court’s decision reveals whether the judge interpreted the law properly and allows the evaluator to assess the judge’s ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evaluator are therefore endogenous, because the probability of an appeal depends on the judge’s decision. I find that judges with career concerns tend to be “creative,” i.e., to inefficiently contradict previous decisions.