The Marriage Market, Labor Supply, and Education Choice

The Marriage Market, Labor Supply, and Education Choice
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DOI:
10.1086/698748
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发表时间:
2018-10-01
影响因子:
8.2
通讯作者:
Meghir, Costas
Meghir, Costas
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Chiappori, Pierre-Andre;Dias, Monica Costa;Meghir, Costas

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在可转移效用的背景下,我们建立了一个教育、婚姻、劳动力供应和消费的均衡生命周期模型。个人从选择教育投资开始,期待婚姻市场和劳动力市场的回报。然后,他们根据婚姻的经济价值和偏好进行匹配。婚姻市场的均衡决定了家庭内部资源的分配。结婚后的家庭(已婚或单身)在不确定的情况下储蓄、提供劳动力、消费私人和公共商品。因此,婚姻具有提供公共产品和分担风险的双重作用。该模型是使用英国家庭小组调查进行估计的。
We develop an equilibrium life cycle model of education, marriage, labor supply, and consumption in a transferable utility context. Individuals start by choosing their investments in education anticipating returns in the marriage market and the labor market. They then match on the basis of the economic value of marriage and preferences. Equilibrium in the marriage market determines intrahousehold allocation of resources. Following marriage households (married or single) save, supply labor, and consume private and public commodities under uncertainty. Marriage thus has the dual role of providing public goods and offering risk sharing. The model is estimated using the British Household Panel Survey.