Autism as a Form of Life: Wittgenstein and the Psychological Coherence of Autism
Autism as a Form of Life: Wittgenstein and the Psychological Coherence of Autism
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DOI：
10.1111/meta.12366
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发表时间：
2019-07-01
期刊：
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
Chapman, Robert
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chapman, Robert
自闭症通常被认为是一种特殊的心理。占主导地位的神经认知主义方法通过超系统化和低移情的静态处理特征来解释这一点。相比之下，维特根斯坦启发的评论家认为，自闭症的连贯性产生关系，从主体间的破坏，阻碍了进入一个共同的世界的语言意义。本文认为，这两个阵营都是过度简化和冲突的新兴证据，部分原因是不可否认地假设自闭症的赤字为基础的框架。然后，它发展了一个新的维特根斯坦帐户自闭症作为一种不同的生活形式，避免了这些问题。而不是自闭症系统化是自闭症认知的基础，它被认为是对前认识和语义焦虑的反应，这些焦虑伴随着在不同形式的生活中作为少数群体的发展。这种重新构建可以为自闭症患者的心理提供一个连贯的解释，并具有重要的概念，实践和伦理意义。
Autism is often taken to be a specific kind of mind. The dominant neuro-cognitivist approach explains this via static processing traits framed in terms of hyper-systemising and hypo-empathising. By contrast, Wittgenstein-inspired commentators argue that the coherence of autism arises relationally, from intersubjective disruption that hinders access to a shared world of linguistic meaning. This paper argues that both camps are unduly reductionistic and conflict with emerging evidence, due in part to unjustifiably assuming a deficit-based framing of autism. It then develops a new Wittgensteinian account-autism as a different form of life-which avoids these issues. Rather than autistic systemising being the basis of autistic cognition, it is taken to be a reaction to pre-epistemic and semantic anxieties that come with developing as a minority within a different form of life. This re-framing can provide a coherent account of the autistic mind, and has significant conceptual, practical, and ethical implications.