99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition
99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition
复制标题
99%%20收入%20通过%20增强%20竞争
DOI：
10.1145/3219166.3219202
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Rubinstein
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Feldman;Ophir Friedler;A. Rubinstein
最近的一系列研究表明，即使在单一卖家和单一买家对m种商品进行附加的独立估值的简单设置下，收入最大化的机制也复杂得令人望而却步。解决这个问题的方法主要有两种：近似法：两种简单机制中最好的一种(单独销售每件商品，或将所有商品捆绑销售)，获得最优收益的六分之一[1]。增强竞争：在增加m个买家的情况下运行简单的VCG机制至少可以在原始市场获得最优收入[17]。然而，这两种方法都存在严重的缺陷：一方面，损失83%的收入在任何应用中都是不可接受的。另一方面，吸引线性数量的新买家可能是令人望而却步的。我们证明，通过将这两种方法结合起来，一个人可以实现两全其美。具体地说，对于任何恒定的ε，人们可以通过运行简单的机制来获得最优收入的(1-ε)部分-单独销售每件商品或将所有商品捆绑销售-额外的买家要少得多：对数、常量，有时甚至没有额外买家。
A sequence of recent studies show that even in the simple setting of a single seller and a single buyer with additive, independent valuations over m items, the revenue-maximizing mechanism is prohibitively complex. This problem has been addressed using two main approaches: Approximation: the best of two simple mechanisms (sell each item separately, or sell all the items as one bundle) gives 1/6 of the optimal revenue [1]. Enhanced competition: running the simple VCG mechanism with additional m buyers extracts at least the optimal revenue in the original market [17]. Both approaches, however, suffer from severe drawbacks: On the one hand, losing 83% of the revenue is hardly acceptable in any application. On the other hand, attracting a linear number of new buyers may be prohibitive. We show that by combining the two approaches one can achieve the best of both worlds. Specifically, for any constant ε one can obtain a (1-ε) fraction of the optimal revenue by running simple mechanisms --- either selling each item separately or selling all items as a single bundle --- with substantially fewer additional buyers: logarithmic, constant, or even none in some cases.
通过加强竞争实现稳健的拍卖收入
影响因子：
2.7
作者：
Roughgarden, Tim;Talgam-Cohen, Inbal;Yan, Qiqi
通讯作者：
Yan, Qiqi
DOI：
10.1145/2764468.2764539
发表时间：
2014-09
期刊：
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子：
--
作者：
C. Daskalakis;Alan Deckelbaum;Christos Tzamos
通讯作者：
C. Daskalakis;Alan Deckelbaum;Christos Tzamos