The demand for insurance against common shocks
The demand for insurance against common shocks
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.10.001
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发表时间：
2014-01-01
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Sadoulet, E.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
de Janvry, A.;Dequiedt, V.;Sadoulet, E.
近年来，发展中国家向小农提供了基于指数的保险，以防范天气冲击等常见冲击。尽管这些产品具有吸引人的特性，但需求却很低。我们经常考虑农民是具有共同利益的团体成员的情况。我们表明，这在决定保险的群体成员之间创造了战略互动，减少了保险需求，原因有两个。一种是搭便车，因为当一个成员选择投保时，其他成员会受到正外部性的影响。另一个是潜在的协调失败，因为如果其他成员不投保，厌恶风险的成员投保可能就没有利润。因此，我们认为，如果保险政策出售给团体而不是个人，对共同冲击保险的需求可能会增加。(C) 2013 Elsevier B.V.版权所有
In recent years, index-based insurance has been offered to smallholder farmers in the developing world to protect against common shocks such as weather shocks. Despite their attractive properties, these products have met with low demand. We consider the frequent situation where farmers are members of groups with common interests. We show that this creates strategic interactions among group members in deciding to insure that reduce the demand for insurance for two reasons. One is free riding due to positive externalities on other group members when a member chooses to insure. The other is potential coordination failure because it may not be profitable for a risk-averse member to insure if the other members do not. As a consequence, we argue that the demand for insurance against common shocks could increase if the insurance policy were sold to groups rather than to individuals. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.