Insiders and Outsiders in Wage Determination
Insiders and Outsiders in Wage Determination
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工资决定中的内部人和外部人
DOI：
10.1007/978-1-349-08596-5_18
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发表时间：
1985
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Solow
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Solow
一家公司从一群内部人士或经验丰富的员工开始。还有一大群外来者，他们最初的工作效率较低，但在工作一段时间后就转变为内部人士。该公司受益于拥有大量的内部人员，其中一些人可能会在不景气的年份被解雇。内部人士从保持自己的人数较少中获益。如果内部人单方面设定工资，在这种极端情况下，他们会选择一条阻止外部人就业的道路，即使未来的就业前景很好。如果工资路径是通过双边谈判确定的，那么在某些情况下，企业的额外优势允许雇佣一些外部人员。
A firm starts with a group of insiders or seasoned workers. There is also a large pool of outsiders who are initially less productive, but are transformed into insiders after one period of employment. The firm gains from having a large pool of insiders, some of whom may be laid off in bad years. Insiders gain from keeping their numbers small. If the insiders set their wage unilaterally, they will choose a path that—in this extreme case—prevents employment of outsiders even if future employment prospects are good. If the wage path is set by bilateral bargaining, the extra advantage to the firm permits employment of some outsiders in some situations.