The impact of family ownership on establishment and ownership modes in foreign direct investment: The moderating role of corruption in host countries
The impact of family ownership on establishment and ownership modes in foreign direct investment: The moderating role of corruption in host countries
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家庭所有权对外国直接投资的设立和所有权模式的影响：东道国腐败的调节作用
DOI：
10.1002/gsj.1198
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
Asaba Shigeru
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yamanoi Junichi;Asaba Shigeru
研究摘要：本文从社会情感财富的角度考察了家庭所有权对外商直接投资的影响。在建立外国子公司时，家族所有权程度较高的公司更有可能进行格林菲尔德投资和完全股权所有权，以维持家族所有者的社会情感财富。此外，这些关系在腐败程度较高的国家更为明显。在腐败国家，必须加强对外国子公司的控制，以限制其腐败行为，因为腐败行为可能严重损害公司的社会情感财富，并破坏家族所有者的声誉。通过使用日本电子机械行业上市企业进入国外市场的数据集，我们发现我们的假设得到了普遍的支持。管理摘要：我们发现的证据表明，日本上市的电子机械制造商具有较大的家庭所有权，更有可能选择格林菲尔德投资和完全所有权时进入国外。这一结果表明，家族企业主更愿意保持对当地子公司的强有力的控制，可能是为了保护他们的社会情感财富。此外，当家族企业进入腐败程度较高的国家时，它们选择格林菲尔德投资的倾向更强。家族企业的管理者和投资者可能需要注意家族所有者的进入模式选择，这可能会为了保护社会情感财富而过度激励，可能会牺牲经济财富。
Research Summary:In this study, we adopt a socioemotional wealth perspective to examine the influence of family ownership on foreign direct investment. When establishing foreign subsidiaries, firms with greater degrees of family ownership are more likely to engage in greenfield investment and full equity ownership in order to maintain family owners’ socioemotional wealth. Additionally, these relationships are more pronounced in countries with higher levels of corruption. In corrupt countries, greater control over foreign subsidiaries is necessary to restrict their corrupt behaviors, which can seriously damage the firm’s socioemotional wealth and destroy the reputation of the family owners. By using a dataset of foreign market entries by Japanese listed firms in the electronic machinery industry, we find general support for our hypotheses.Managerial Summary:We find evidence that Japanese listed electronic machinery manufacturers with larger family ownership are more likely to choose greenfield investment and full ownership when entering foreign countries. This result suggests that family owners prefer to maintain strong control on local subsidiaries, possibly for preserving their socioemotional wealth. Additionally, this tendency of family firms’ regarding the choice of greenfield investment is stronger when they enter countries with higher levels of corruption. Managers and investors of family firms might need to pay attention to family owners’ entry mode choices, which could be incentivized excessively for the preservation of socioemotional wealth, possibly at the expense of economic wealth.