Incentive subsidy scheme design with elastic transport demand
Incentive subsidy scheme design with elastic transport demand
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DOI：
10.1002/atr.1253
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发表时间：
2014-12
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
W. Zou;S. Mizokami
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. Zou;S. Mizokami
由于公交乘客数量的下降，巨额的公共交通补贴赤字已经成为一些地方政府沉重的财政负担。考虑到社会福利的最大化，将绩效合同应用到公共汽车服务中是必要的。针对基于绩效的合同存在的两个问题，构建了考虑服务水平决策权和计算适当频率弹性的激励补贴合同。同时，我们还考虑了被大多数研究者忽视的公交运营商的作用。在该方案下，基于5个假设对服务水平的决策权进行了讨论，同时激励公交运营商降低标准，提高服务水平。以Arao市公交运营为例说明，公交运营商在确定公交运行频率时，最优运行频率为零。如果运营商确定了努力，那么最优努力也等于零，目标是利润最大化。同时，公交运营商可以发挥自己的作用，降低成本，提高服务水平，帮助公交运营商和当地政府实现双赢，在所有因素都由政府决定的情况下，最大限度地提高社会效益。版权所有©2013JohnWiley& Sons， Ltd。由于私家车数量的增加，城市地区出现了严重的交通堵塞，因此产生了外部成本。这些外部成本的存在反映在世界各国政府寻求更可持续的方式来满足客运需求，包括支持公共交通，因为它有能力履行社会义务并减少私家车使用的外部成本。因此，鉴于大规模经济，过境补贴是必要的，以便使服务能够设定在合理有效地利用公共交通的水平上。此外，除了帮助城市缓解城市拥堵和减少燃料消耗之外，为那些不能开车的人提供服务也被认为是重要的。尽管公交补贴对于降低公共交通价格和减少歧视是必要的，但长期以来一直存在争议。Pucher等人指出，成本和补贴是共同决定的，因为成本越高，补贴就越多，补贴又会导致成本越高。竞争性招标作为一种以控制政府提供服务的成本为主要目标的机制，被提出并应用。CT合同吸引了大量的兴趣，因为它试图对合同运营商施加责任和激励，以降低成本。激励合同有三种：总成本合同、净成本合同和成本加成合同。伦敦引入的总成本合同是指在指定期间向运营商支付提供特定服务的特定金额，而所收取的所有收入都归政府所有。根据针对香港巴士公司制定的净成本合约，收入必须覆盖成本，并保证利润。worworman b[3]得出结论，合同付款
SUMMARY Huge public transport subsidies caused by deficits have become a heavy financial burden on some local governments due to the decline of bus passenger numbers. It is essential to apply the performance-based contract to bus services considering maximization of social welfare. This paper constructs an incentive subsidy contract considering the decision-making powers of the service level and calculating the proper frequency elasticity aiming at two problems of performance-based contracts. Meanwhile, we consider a role of bus operators ignored by most researchers. Under the scheme, the decision-making power of the service level is discussed basedon fiveassumptions,andmeanwhile,busoperatorsaremotivatedtoreducecostandimproveservicelevel in the scheme. The case of the bus service of Arao city indicates that the optimal frequency equals to zero when bus operators decidefrequency.Ifbus operatorsdetermineefforts,theoptimaleffort also equalstozerowiththe goal of maximizing the profit. Also, bus operators can play their roles in lessening cost and improving service level to help bus operators and the local government achieve a win-win situation, which maximizes the social benefitinthissubsidyschemewhenallfactorsaredecidedbythegovernment.Copyright©2013JohnWiley& Sons, Ltd. External costs are incurred in urban areas that experience substantial levels of traffic congestion due to the increasing number of private cars. The existence of these external costs is reflected in governments around the world seeking more sustainable means of meeting passenger transport requirements, including support for public transport because of its capacity to meet social obligations and to reduce the external costs of private car use. Therefore, transit subsidies are necessary, given substantial economies of scale, in order to permit services to be set at a level that will result in reasonably efficient use of the public transport. Also, it is regarded as important to provide service for those who are unable to drive, in addition to helping cities find some relief from urban congestion and reducing fuel consumption. Although transit subsidies are necessary to lower the price of public transport and diminish discrimination, they have long been controversial. Pucher et al. [1] noted that costs and subsidies are jointly determined, as higher costs elicit more subsidies, which in turn induce higher costs. As a mechanism with a major objective of containing the cost to government of service provision, competitive tendering (CT) was proposed and applied. The CT contract attracted significant interest because of its attempt to apply responsibilities and incentives to contract operators to reduce cost. The three kinds of incentive contracts are gross-cost, net-cost, and cost-plus contracts. The gross-cost contract introduced in London is payment to the operator of a specified sum of provision of the specifi ed service for as pecified period, with all revenue collected being for the account of the government [2]. Under the net-cost contract, instituted to Hong Kong bus companies, revenues must cover cost and guarantee profit. Worcman [3] concluded that contract payments of