The Party Structure of Mutual Funds
The Party Structure of Mutual Funds
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共同基金的政党结构
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3124039
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Emiliano M. Catan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ryan Bubb;Emiliano M. Catan
我们调查了共同基金的公司治理偏好结构，这通过它们对投资组合公司股票的投票方式来揭示。我们应用机器学习文献中的无监督学习工具来分析共同基金的投票，发现一个简洁的二维模型可以解释大部分共同基金的投票。这些维度捕捉了公司治理的竞争愿景，并与领先的代理顾问的建议相关。聚类分析显示，共同基金分为三个“党派”——传统治理党、股东改革党和股东抗议党，它们遵循独特的公司治理和股东角色理念。
We investigate the structure of mutual funds’ corporate governance preferences as revealed by how they vote their shares in portfolio companies. We apply unsupervised learning tools from the machine learning literature to analyze mutual funds’ votes and find that a parsimonious two-dimensional model can explain the bulk of mutual fund voting. The dimensions capture competing visions of corporate governance and are related to the leading proxy advisors’ recommendations. Cluster analysis shows that mutual funds are organized into three “parties”—the Traditional Governance Party, Shareholder Reform Party, and Shareholder Protest Party—that follow distinctive philosophies of corporate governance and shareholders’ role.