Wealth Reduction in White Knight Bids
Wealth Reduction in White Knight Bids
复制标题
白骑士出价中的财富减少
DOI：
10.2307/3666018
复制
发表时间：
1992
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
James Owers
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Banerjee;James Owers
本文考察了“白骑士”参与公司控制权争夺时所经历的价值变化。在出价日结束的两天窗口中，近80%的白骑士获得了负的异常回报。在事件的两侧，损失会持续更长时间的窗口期。我们考察了一组控制竞争各方都是交易所上市的配对三人组，并从福利经济学的角度观察到，这些竞争不会导致帕累托优态，而是满足希克斯-卡尔多补偿原则的较弱效率标准。
The paper investigates the value changes experienced by white knights when they are involved in corporate control contests. Close to 80% of the white knights incur a negative abnormal return for the two-day window ending on the date of their bid. The losses persist for longer windows on either side of the event. We examine a set of matched-trios where all parties to the control contest are exchange-listed, and observe that from a welfare economics perspective, these contests do not lead to Pareto superior states, but meet the weaker efficiency criterion of the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle.