Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt
Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt
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主权债务货币联盟的自由裁量政策
DOI：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.11.007
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
Leith C
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Leith C
本文考察了多个国家的财政政策制定者和一个单一的货币政策制定者之间的相互作用，以应对一些或所有国家的政府债务冲击的货币联盟。我们假设国家政府以最佳方式应对过度债务，但他们没有获得承诺技术。这意味着国家财政政策逐步减少债务：缺乏承诺技术排除了稳态债务的随机游走，但保持国家竞争力的需要避免了过快的债务削减。如果央行能够做出承诺，它只会在应对债务增加时略微调整政策，让国家财政政策承担大部分调整。然而，如果它不能承诺，那么最优货币政策就需要使用利率来迅速减少债务，这将带来巨大的福利成本。我们表明，在这种情况下，中央银行在制定政策时最好忽略国家财政政策。
This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.