Impact of border barriers, returning migrants, and trade diversion in Brexit: Firm exit and loss of variety
Impact of border barriers, returning migrants, and trade diversion in Brexit: Firm exit and loss of variety
复制标题
英国退欧中边境壁垒、回国移民和贸易转移的影响：企业退出和多样性丧失
DOI：
10.1016/j.econmod.2017.09.018
复制
发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
Hosoe Nobuhiro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
細江宣裕;阿久根 優子;Hosoe Nobuhiro
我们使用可计算的一般均衡模型来研究英国脱欧（英国计划退出欧盟）的影响，该模型具有传统的规模报酬不变（CRS）和规模报酬递增（IRS）技术以及企业异质性（梅利茨）。我们表明，与英国脱欧相关的关税和非关税壁垒的实施引发了英国与欧盟其余 27 个成员国 (EU27) 之间双边贸易的大幅收缩，而退出市场的情况又加剧了这种情况。考虑到这些贸易壁垒、预算节约、从英国返回欧盟 27 国的移民以及欧盟 27 国内部一体化以及与美国和日本的自由贸易协定，国税局模型预测英国 GDP 的总出口损失为 5.1-5.8%，总福利损失为 1.1-1.5%。这比 CRS 模型的预测高出 60%。然而，不同行业对产出的影响各不相同，英国化学和汽车行业将收缩，但食品和饮料行业以及商业和信息和通信技术服务行业将扩大。相比之下，欧盟 27 国将从其他一体化计划中获益匪浅，但从更强大的英国-欧盟 27 国边境壁垒中损失甚微。这表明，欧盟27国应该对旨在避免“硬脱欧”（英国放弃单一市场的完全准入）的谈判兴趣不大，而将重点放在与英国以外的贸易伙伴的一体化计划上会更有成效。
We investigate the impact of Brexit (the UK's planned withdrawal from the European Union) using computable general equilibrium models featuring conventional constant returns-to-scale (CRS) and increasing returns-to-scale (IRS) technology and firm heterogeneity, à la Melitz. We show that the imposition of the tariff and nontariff barriers associated with Brexit triggers the significant contraction of bilateral trade between the UK and the remaining 27 members of the European Union (EU27), exacerbated by firm exit from export markets. Given the imposition of these trade barriers, budget savings, migrants returning to the EU27 from the UK, and intra-EU27 integration and free trade agreements with the US and Japan, the IRS model predicts a total export loss of 5.1–5.8% of UK GDP and a total welfare loss of 1.1–1.5%. This is 60% greater than the CRS model predictions. However, the impact on output would vary between industries, whereby the UK chemical and automobile industries would contract, but its food and beverage sector and the business and information and communication technology service sectors would expand. In contrast, the EU27 would gain substantially from other integration programs, but lose very little from the stronger UK–EU27 border barriers. This suggests that the EU27 should have little interest in negotiations aimed at avoiding a “hard Brexit” (the surrendering by the UK of full access to the single market) and that it would be more productive for it to focus on integration programs with trade partners other than the UK.