Property Rights within Government, and Devices to Increase Governmental Efficiency
Property Rights within Government, and Devices to Increase Governmental Efficiency
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政府内部的产权以及提高政府效率的手段
DOI：
10.2307/1056589
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发表时间：
1972
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
R. Mckean
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Mckean
人们已经尝试或提倡了许多提高政府效率的办法。例子包括成本效益分析，计划预算，税收支出预算，重组，股票和工业基金，与私人公司的合同，而不是内部的政府生产，以及志愿军。所有这些手段都可以产生良好的效果，我想强调，我并不反对使用这些手段。然而，其影响的大小关键取决于这样一个问题：这些手段对政府官员个人的财产权或奖励的可支配性--从而对“激励”--有什么影响？为了评估这些手段的重要性，我们应该批判性地看待选民、立法者、高级官员和其他政府人员所面临的回报的可捕获性。如果一个设备对可使用性的影响很小，人们就不应该期望它对行为和决策产生巨大的影响。很少有经济学家相信，仅仅是劝诫就能对私营企业产生巨大影响，然而，当许多人求助于政府机构时，他们似乎对劝诫抱有一种奇怪的信念。在本文中，我希望总结产权和可占有性的意义，回顾可占有性和效率之间的联系，然后重新评估几种提高效率的手段可能产生的影响。
Numerous devices to increa e governmental efficiency have been tried or advocated. Examples include cost-benefit analysis, program budgeting, the tax-expenditure budget, reorganizations, stock and industrial funds, contracts with private firms instead of in-house government production, and the volunteer army. All of these devices can have desirable effects, and I wish to emphasize that I am not opposing their use. The magnitude of their impacts, however, depends crucially on the issue: What do these devices do to the property rights or appropriability of rewards-and therefore to the "incentives"-of individual officials in government? In order to appraise the significance of these devices, one should look critically at the capturability of rewards confronting voters, legislators, top officials, and other government personnel. If a device has little impact on appropriability, one should not expect dramatic impacts on behavior and decisions. Few economists believe that mere exhortation will greatly influence private firms, yet many persons seem to have a curious faith in exhortation when they turn to government agencies. In this paper I wish to summarize the significance of property rights and appropriability, review the connection between appropriability and efficiency, and then reassess the probable impacts of several efficiency-promoting devices.