The Immigration Policy Puzzle
The Immigration Policy Puzzle
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移民政策之谜
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9396.2011.00995.x
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Ruta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Giordani;M. Ruta
本文重新审视了移民政策的难题：标准经济理论预测自由移民会改善当地人的福利，但（除了历史上的例外）开放政策从未在实践中得到实施。是什么让这个谜题合理化？我们首先回顾了移民政策模型，在该模型中，政策制定者在扣除移民税收负担后最大化当地人的国民收入（Borjas，1995）。我们表明，当接收地区的技术由标准柯布-道格拉斯函数或 CES 函数描述时，该模型无法提供现实的政策结果，因为最优政策完全禁止移民，或者意味着移民数量相对于当地人而言不切实际。然后本文描述了这个基本模型的三个扩展，使理论与证据相一致。第一个介绍了移民社区融入目的地国的成本；第二个因素考虑了政策制定者对不同社会群体的再分配问题；最后一个扩展考虑了（技术）移民对接收国经济的积极溢出效应。
This paper revisits the puzzle of immigration policy: standard economic theory predicts that free immigration improves natives' welfare, but (with few historical exceptions) an open door policy is never implemented in practice. What rationalizes the puzzle? We first review the model of immigration policy where the policy maker maximizes national income of natives net of the tax burden of immigration (Borjas, 1995). We show that this model fails to provide realistic policy outcomes when the receiving region's technology is described by a standard Cobb-Douglas or CES function, as the optimal policy imposes a complete ban on immigration or implies an unrealistically large number of immigrants relative to natives. Then the paper describes three extensions of this basic model that reconcile the theory with the evidence. The first introduces a cost of integration of the immigrant community in the destination country; the second takes into account the policy maker's redistributive concern across different social groups; the last extension considers positive spillover effects of (skilled) migrants on the receiving economy.