Wage Bargaining, Holdout, and Inflation
Wage Bargaining, Holdout, and Inflation
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工资谈判、抵制和通货膨胀
DOI：
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Steinar Holden
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Steinar Holden
在许多国家，习惯上在工资谈判期间（坚持）按照旧合同的条款继续生产，除非开始停工。本文分析了一个模型，其中工人在坚持抵制期间故意降低工作效率，而公司则减少奖金支付。如果公司坚持抵制的成本高于工人，工资谈判将导致名义工资上涨。该模型意味着菲利普斯曲线由两个垂直部分组成；一种是高通胀和低失业率，另一种是低通胀和高失业率。版权所有 1997 英国皇家经济学会。
In many countries, it is customary that production continues under the terms of the old contract during wage negotiations (holdout), unless a work stoppage is initiated. This paper analyzes a model where the workers deliberately work less efficiently during a holdout, while the firm reduces bonus payments. If a holdout is more costly to the firm than to the workers, the wage bargaining will result in a nominal wage increase. The model implies a Phillips curve that consists of two vertical parts; one with high inflation and low unemployment and one with low inflation and high unemployment. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.