Patch leaving strategies and superparasitism: an asymmetric generalized war of attrition
Patch leaving strategies and superparasitism: an asymmetric generalized war of attrition
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DOI：
10.1016/s0022-5193(03)00223-6
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发表时间：
2003-11-07
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Cannings, C
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Haccou, P;Glaizot, O;Cannings, C
当几个竞争者耗尽一个补丁时，如果其他人离开，他们每个人留下来可能是有利的，而另一方面，留得更长会降低每个人的预期回报。这种情况可以被认为是一场普遍的消耗战。以前的研究表明，当竞争对手干扰时，最优斑块离开策略是随机的，并且期望离开时间比边际值定理预测的要大得多，重寄生的可能性，例如在寄生虫中发生的可能性，导致了这种干扰。此外，它还带来了一些复杂的情况。首先，离开斑块的雌性斑块的回报受到剩余个体产卵的影响。其次，雌虫到达时间的差异导致了与回报相关的不对称性，因为在超寄生开始的时刻，较早到达的雌虫在斑块中寄生的宿主比较晚到达的雌虫更多。我们证明了这可以被建模为不对称的广义消耗战，并推导出ESS的全局特征，用于同时决定何时开始超寄生和何时离开斑块。(C)2003爱思唯尔有限公司。保留所有权利。
When several competitors deplete a patch, it can be advantageous for each of them to stay provided that others leave, whereas, on the other hand, staying longer decreases the expected payoff for everyone. This situation can be considered as a generalized war of attrition. Previous studies have shown that optimal patch leaving strategies become stochastic and the expected leaving time is much larger than predicted by the marginal value theorem when competitors interfere.The possibility of superparasitism, as occurs for example in parasitoids, induces such interference. In addition, it gives several complications. First, the payoff of females that have left the patch is affected by the ovipositions of the remaining individuals. Second, differences in the arrival time of females cause payoff-relevant asymmetries, since females that arrived early on have parasitized more hosts in a patch at the moment superparasitism starts than those that arrived later.We show that this can be modelled as an asymmetric generalized war of attrition, and derive global characteristics of the ESS for simultaneous decisions on when to start superparasitism and when to leave a patch. (C) 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.