To harmonize or to compete? That's not the question
To harmonize or to compete? That's not the question
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协调还是竞争？
DOI：
10.1016/0047-2727(95)01555-8
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发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
R. Eichenberger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. Frey;R. Eichenberger
新古典公共经济学家强调差别税制引起的经济扭曲，因此赞成统一；政治经济学家关注政治扭曲，因此拒绝协调。然而，关于经济扭曲和政治扭曲之间的可能性边界的政策选择往往存在偏见：经济顾问、政治家和利益集团通常倾向于协调一致。此外，重新建立税收差异的激励措施也破坏了统一。这两项活动都防止可能性边界成为简单的选择菜单。全民公投和功能性、重叠性、竞争性司法管辖区（FOCJ）是能够减少政治扭曲并改变可能性边界的制度。
Neoclassical public economists stress economic distortions induced by differential taxation and therefore favour harmonization; political economists focus on political distortions and therefore reject harmonization. However, policy choices on the possibility frontier between economic and political distortions tend to be biased: economic advisers, politicians and interest groups typically favour harmonization. Harmonization is, moreover, undermined by incentives to re-establish tax differences. Both activities prevent the possibility frontier from being simply a menu of choice. Popular referenda and functional, overlapping, competing jurisdictions (FOCJs) are institutions able to reduce political distortions and to shift the possibility frontier.