The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match
The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.20151425
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发表时间：
2017-12-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Pathak, Parag A.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila;Agarwal, Nikhil;Pathak, Parag A.
协调一次派位制是一项大众化的教育改革。我们发现，在纽约市的学校分配机制不协调的报价产生不匹配。三分之一的申请人在主轮之后没有分配，后来被行政安排在不太理想的学校。我们评估的影响，新的协调机制的基础上推迟接受估计学生的喜好。新的机制实现了80%的可能收益，从一个没有选择的社区极端到一个功利主义的基准。协调报价主导了进一步算法修改的效果。最有可能被行政分配的学生在福利和随后的成就方面获得了最大的收益。
Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80 percent of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement.