Simple Cost-Sharing Contracts
Simple Cost-Sharing Contracts
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.97.1.419
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发表时间：
2007-02
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Leon Yang Chu;D. Sappington
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文献类型：
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作者：
Leon Yang Chu;D. Sappington
我们将William Rogerson（2003）对简单采购合同的有趣分析扩展到供应商的固有生产成本不一定均匀分布的情况。虽然罗杰森分析的简单合同在较小的成本实现相对可能时表现得非常好，但在较大的成本实现相对可能时表现得很差。我们表明，在所有考虑的情况下，一个简单的合同对-一个涉及线性成本分摊和一个涉及全部成本报销-总是可以确保超过73%的收益实现了一个完全最优的合同。(JEL D86）
We extend William Rogerson's (2003) intriguing analysis of simple procurement contracts to settings where the supplier’s innate production cost is not necessarily distributed uniformly. Although the simple contract that Rogerson analyzes performs remarkably well when the smaller cost realizations are relatively likely, it can perform poorly when the larger cost realizations are relatively likely. We show that in all settings under consideration, a simple pair of contracts – one that involves linear cost sharing and one that involves full cost reimbursement – can always secure more than 73 percent of the gain achieved with a fully optimal contract. (JEL D86)