Galindo-Garcia Identity-Based Signature Revisited
Galindo-Garcia Identity-Based Signature Revisited
复制标题
重新审视 Galindo-Garcia 基于身份的签名
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-37682-5_32
复制
发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Vikas Kumar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Chatterjee;Chethan Kamath;Vikas Kumar
In Africacrypt 2009, Galindo-Garcia [12] proposed a lightweight identity-based signature (IBS) scheme based on the Schnorr signature. The construction is simple and claimed to be the most efficient IBS till date. The security is based on the discrete-log assumption and the security argument consists of two reductions: $\mathcal{B}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{B}_{2}$, both of which use the multiple-forking lemma [4] to solve the discrete-log problem (DLP).
In this work, we revisit the security argument given in [12]. Our contributions are two fold: (i) we identify several problems in the original argument and (ii) we provide a detailed new security argument which allows significantly tighter reductions. In particular, we show that the reduction $\mathcal{B}_{1}$ in [12] fails in the standard security model for IBS [1], while the reduction $\mathcal{B}_{2}$ is incomplete. To remedy these problems, we adopt a two-pronged approach. First, we sketch ways to fill the gaps by making minimal changes to the structure of the original security argument; then, we provide a new security argument. The new argument consists of three reductions: $\mathcal{R}_{1}$, $\mathcal{R}_{2}$ and $\mathcal{R}_{3}$ and in each of them, solving the DLP is reduced to breaking the IBS. $\mathcal{R}_{1}$ uses the general forking lemma [2] together with the programming of the random oracles and Coron's technique [8]. Reductions $\mathcal{R}_{2}$ and $\mathcal{R}_{3}$, on the other hand, use the multiple-forking lemma along with the programming of the random oracles. We show that the reductions $\mathcal{R}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{R}_{2}$ are significantly tighter than their original counterparts.
In Africacrypt 2009, Galindo-Garcia [12] proposed a lightweight identity-based signature (IBS) scheme based on the Schnorr signature. The construction is simple and claimed to be the most efficient IBS till date. The security is based on the discrete-log assumption and the security argument consists of two reductions: $\mathcal{B}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{B}_{2}$, both of which use the multiple-forking lemma [4] to solve the discrete-log problem (DLP).
In this work, we revisit the security argument given in [12]. Our contributions are two fold: (i) we identify several problems in the original argument and (ii) we provide a detailed new security argument which allows significantly tighter reductions. In particular, we show that the reduction $\mathcal{B}_{1}$ in [12] fails in the standard security model for IBS [1], while the reduction $\mathcal{B}_{2}$ is incomplete. To remedy these problems, we adopt a two-pronged approach. First, we sketch ways to fill the gaps by making minimal changes to the structure of the original security argument; then, we provide a new security argument. The new argument consists of three reductions: $\mathcal{R}_{1}$, $\mathcal{R}_{2}$ and $\mathcal{R}_{3}$ and in each of them, solving the DLP is reduced to breaking the IBS. $\mathcal{R}_{1}$ uses the general forking lemma [2] together with the programming of the random oracles and Coron's technique [8]. Reductions $\mathcal{R}_{2}$ and $\mathcal{R}_{3}$, on the other hand, use the multiple-forking lemma along with the programming of the random oracles. We show that the reductions $\mathcal{R}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{R}_{2}$ are significantly tighter than their original counterparts.