Trust and Missed Opportunities in International Relations
Trust and Missed Opportunities in International Relations
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国际关系中的信任与错失机遇
DOI：
10.1111/0162-895x.00075
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发表时间：
1997
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
D. W. Larson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. W. Larson
随着冷战的结束，我们必须思考是否错过了规范军备竞赛和全球竞争的机会，这几乎使美国破产，并促成了苏联的解体。错失达成协议的机会是指冲突各方至少有一种选择，而不是不达成协议。核心现实主义者认为，国家竞争领土，武器和影响力，因为它们有相互冲突的国家利益。软核心现实主义者认为，这种冲突是国际无政府状态和不确定性的影响，国家可以根据互惠原则进行合作。我认为，国家往往无法合作，即使他们有兼容的偏好，因为政策制定者作出不正确的推断对手的动机和意图，一个过程，可以照亮社会心理学。我提出了三种不同的解释，在国际关系中的信任和不信任的理性选择，国内结构和社会心理。如果决策者是谨慎的，他们会评估遵守协议的另一方利益及其声誉。通常，国内政治结构鼓励领导人促进对外部敌人的不信任，以使其内部统治或外交政策合法化。最后，不信任可能导致决策者拒绝接受另一方的合作信号或建议。不信任可以通过一系列逐步达成的协议来克服，其中每一方都可以以有限的代价考验另一方的诚意，或者通过作为一贯政策的一部分的单方面让步。
With the end of the Cold War, we must wonder whether there were missed opportunities to regulate the arms race and global competition, which nearly bankrupted the United States and contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. A missed opportunity for agreement is a situation where there was at least one alternative that the parties to a conflict preferred or would have preferred to nonagreement. Hard-core Realists argue that states compete for territory, arms, and influence because they have conflicting national interests. Soft-core Realists maintain that such conflicts are effects of international anarchy and uncertainty, and that states can cooperate contingent on reciprocity. I argue that states often fail to cooperate even when they have compatible preferences because policy-makers make incorrect inferences about the opponent's motives and intentions, a process that can be illuminated by social psychology. I present three alternative explanations of trust and distrust in international relations-rational choice, domestic structures, and social psychology. If policy-makers are prudent, they will assess the other's interests in observing an agreement as well as its reputation. Often, domestic political structures encourage leaders to promote distrust of an external enemy to legitimize their internal rule or foreign policy. Finally, distrust may lead policy-makers to dismiss the other side's cooperative signals or proposals. Distrust can be overcome by making a series of step-by-step agreements in which each side can test the other's good faith at limited cost, or through unilateral concessions as part of a consistent policy.