Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism
Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism
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超评价主义与逻辑修正主义
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发表时间：
2008
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通讯作者：
J. Williams
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作者：
J. Williams
在有关超估值主义的文献中，人们关注的一个中心问题是其所谓的逻辑修正主义的可接受性。我对这场辩论的前提提出了质疑：如果得到恰当的解释，超估值的结果没有任何修正的意义。我提供了新的考虑，以支持超估值后果应该以“全球”方式表征的主张。但是，与Williamson和Keefe相比，我认为超估值主义并没有给我们熟悉的推理模式（如还原法和条件证明）带来反例。我的案子建立在一个有争议的假设之上。因此，我通过证明，即使这一假设被否定，超估值结果具有破坏性修正的理由也被削弱了，从而加强了这一论点。*感谢圣安德鲁斯arch<s:1>中心和利兹CMM的成员进行讨论。特别感谢JC Beall， Ross Cameron, Andrew McGonigal, Joseph Melia, Greg Restall， Achille Varzi和Elia Zardini的讨论。也非常感谢杰米斯塔克的排版工作。2 .基夫，R.，《模糊理论》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2000）。在关于超估值主义的文献中，关注的一个中心来源是其所谓的逻辑修正主义的可接受性或其他方面。蒂莫西·威廉姆森（Timothy Williamson）声称，超估值主义导致：……超价值论“肯定”逻辑中经典的对立规则、条件证明规则、案例论证规则和反证法规则的分解。威廉姆森对这种修正主义很不满意：条件证明、案例论证和反证法在自然演绎系统中发挥着至关重要的作用，自然演绎系统是最接近我们的非正式演绎....的正式系统超价值论者自然会试图用他们的语义结构来解释其他措辞。如果他们的尝试成功了，我们的语言将充斥着这四条规则的反例。另一些接受逻辑修正主义的人则认为，结果是无可辩驳的。因此，基夫：许多评论家都强调了超估值主义逻辑是如何……不能保留某些推理规则或关于逻辑结果的经典原则……3威廉森，同上，第151-152页。即将发表于《哲学杂志》3失败有多重要……支配逻辑结果的某些经典原则？我的回答是，上述超估值主义的特征是可以接受的……这些作者提出的修正主义的案例取决于，在手边的语言中，超估值主义概念“绝对”（“D”算子）的存在。粗略地说，‘ Definitely p ’表示，无论我们如何强化语言中的不确定性，p总是成立的。在这一点上，它是超价值论者的真理概念——“超真理”——的客体语言反映：如果“p”是真的，那么无论我们如何强化我们的语言，它都是超真的。在没有d算子及其相关符的超值语言中，对经典的推理模式没有特别的威胁。一旦把它加进去，就声称下列结果成立，为各自的经典推理模式提供了反例。
In the literature on supervaluationism, a central course of concern has been the acceptability, or otherwise, of its alleged logical revisionism. I attack the presupposition of this debate: arguing that when properly construed, there is no sense in which supervaluational consequence is revisionary. I provide new considerations supporting the claim that the supervaluational consequence should be characterized in a ‘global’ way. But pace Williamson and Keefe, I argue that supervaluationism does not give rise to counterexamples to familiar inference-patterns such as reductio and conditional proof. My case rests on a disputable assumption. I strengthen the argument, therefore, by showing that even if this assumption is denied, the case for supervaluational consequence being damagingly revisionary is undermined. ∗ Thanks to the members of Arché centre in St Andrews, and the CMM in Leeds, for discussion. Thanks in particular to JC Beall, Ross Cameron, Andrew McGonigal, Joseph Melia, Greg Restall, Achille Varzi and Elia Zardini for discussion. Many thanks also to Jamie Stark for typesetting work. 1 Williamson, T., Vagueness (London: Routledge, 1994) 2 Keefe, R., Theories of Vagueness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) JRG Williams. Forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy 2 In the literature on supervaluationism, a central source of concern has been the acceptability, or otherwise, of its alleged logical revisionism. Timothy Williamson claims that supervaluationism gives rise to: ...breakdowns of the classical rules of contraposition, conditional proof, argument by cases and reduction ad absurdum in the supervaluationist logic of ‘definitely’. Williamson is unhappy with such revisionism: Conditional proof, argument by cases and reduction ad absurdum play a vital role in systems of natural deduction, the formal systems closest to our informal deductions....Supervaluationists have naturally tried to use their semantic apparatus to explain other locutions. If their attempts succeed, our language will be riddled with counterexamples to the four rules. Others, accepting the case for logical revisionism, have argued that the upshot is unobjectionable. Thus Keefe: A number of commentators have emphasized how supervaluationist logic...fails to preserve certain rules of inference or classical principles about logical consequence... 3 Williamson, op cit., pp 151-152 4 Ibid. JRG Williams. Forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy 3 How important is the failure...of certain classical principles governing logical consequence?...My reply is that the described features of supervaluationism are acceptable... The case for revisionism that these authors present depends on the presence, in the language at hand, of the supervaluationist notion ‘Definitely’ (the ‘D’ operator). Roughly, ‘Definitely p’ says that, no matter how we sharpen the indeterminacy in our language, p always holds. In this, it is an object-language reflection of the supervaluationist’s notion of truth – ‘supertruth’: the idea being that ‘p’ is supertrue if it is true no matter how we sharpen our language. In a supervaluational language without the D-operator and its relatives, there is no special threat to the classical modes of inference. Once it is added, it is alleged that the following results hold, providing counterexamples to the respective classical mode of inference.